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Note
Blocking Blocks at the Border: Examining
Standard-Essential Patent Litigation Between
Domestic Companies at the ITC
Matthew Norris*
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC)
was created to protect domestic industry and American workers
1
from illegal foreign trade practices. Yet today, the ITC has
become a hotbed of patent litigation, and consumer access to
iPads, Xboxes, and other popular electronics produced by
American companies like Apple and Microsoft hangs in the
balance simply because these products incorporate required
2
technologies. Increasingly, domestic companies have forced the
ITC to resolve cases that are contrary to its intended purpose
by seeking relief for standard-essential patent infringement.
Instead, these cases should be tried in federal court which is

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Professor
Tom Cotter for his advice and guidance in writing this Note. Thanks also to
Sen. Amy Klobuchar for the opportunity to clerk for the Senate Judiciary
Committee, where I first encountered this topic, and to Craig Kalkut and
Sammy Clark for being tremendous mentors throughout the summer. I also
appreciate the tireless work of my colleagues at the Minnesota Law Review
who helped whip this Note into shape. Finally, a big thanks to Section A of the
Class of 2014, with whom I entered this crazy world called law school and with
whom I will leave having gained so many good friends. Copyright © 2013 by
Matthew Norris.
1. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation
of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 540 (2009) (“Congress created the ITC to gain
protectionist support for trade reform.”).
2. See Paul M. Bartkowski & Evan H. Langdon, Standard-Essential
Patents: An Increasingly Contentious Issue at the U.S. International Trade
Commission, CONTEMP. LEGAL NOTES, July 2012, at 1, 2 (“[T]he ITC often
deals with high-tech consumer electronics subject to standards.”); John
Ribeiro, ITC Clears Apple of Infringement of Three Motorola Patents, Holds
Decision on Fourth, PC WORLD (Aug. 26, 2012, 11:50 PM), http://www
.pcworld.com/article/261464/itc_clears_apple_of_infringement_of_three_
motorola_patents_holds_decision_on_fourth.html (reporting that exclusion
orders for iPhones and Xboxes are pending before the ITC).
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better suited to resolving these unique intellectual property
3
disputes.
A Microsoft Windows mobile phone, for instance, that could
only talk to other Windows phones would be largely useless. To
solve this problem and allow products from different companies
to work together, standards setting organizations (SSOs) agree
to certain technical standards, such as 3G which allows
4
wireless phones to transmit and receive data. Frequently, one
or more companies have already developed the technology
5
needed for the standard and own the patent. In exchange for
having its technology adopted as the standard, the patent
owner agrees to license this technology to other companies,
including direct competitors, on reasonable and non6
discriminatory (RAND) terms. These patents become known as
7
standard-essential patents (SEPs). However, this arrangement
can lead to patent hold-ups when the SEP owner demands
higher than market rates for using the patent despite its
8
commitment to license on RAND terms. As a result, some
competitors will use the SEP without a license, leading to
9
patent disputes.
While patent disputes have traditionally been litigated in
federal court, makers of high-tech consumer electronics are
turning to the ITC with increasing frequency to resolve SEP
3. See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to
Enforce Standard-Essential Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 84 (2012) [hereinafter Exclusion Orders] (prepared
statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (arguing that
federal district courts have the tools to address this issue).
4. 2 STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 8E:32 (updated by David M. Epstein, 2013).
5. See 5 ROBERT A. MATHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 34:53.50
(2012).
6. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32. It is customary for SSOs in the
United States to use RAND terms while SSOs in other countries or regions
frequently use fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms or FRAND. See
Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 96 (prepared statement of Joseph F.
Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). The two
terminologies are interchangeable, but since the focus of this Note is on
domestic industry, RAND will be used throughout for the sake of consistency.
7. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testimony Expresses
Concern that Owners of “Standard-Essential” Patents May Obtain Injunctions
Enabling Them to Hold Up Other Firms (July 11, 2012), available at http://ftc
.gov/opa/2012/07/septestimony.shtm.
8. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent
Misuse, 51 IDEA 559, 559 (2011).
9. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 7.
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disputes and gain an advantage over their competitors. The
ITC was originally developed in the protectionist era of the
1920s and 1930s to shield domestic industry from unlawful
foreign trade practices, not to enforce intellectual property
11
rights. Today, the ITC offers several features that make it
attractive to patent litigants such as quick decisions
(investigations are usually completed within 12–16 months)
and administrative law judges that are experienced in patent
12
cases. The critical distinction between the ITC and federal
court, though, is the ITC can only issue exclusion orders, which
stop infringing products at the U.S. border, whereas federal
courts can provide monetary damages in addition to
13
injunctions. This threat of an exclusion order can provide the
SEP holder with significant leverage and increase the risk of
hold-ups for SEPs. Leveraging the threat of exclusion orders in
standard-essential patent disputes has also drawn the ire of
14
15
both the FTC and Department of Justice. The ability to seek
exclusionary relief at the ITC in these types of cases could have
a detrimental effect on competition and consumer welfare,
especially since it could compromise the standard-setting
16
system that is critical to encouraging innovation. In addition,
these SEP cases are unique because they involve contractual
obligations, and the ITC has rejected the availability of several
affirmative defenses that are often applicable in federal court
17
in contract disputes.
Several high-profile ITC investigations in recent years
have involved one American company seeking an exclusion
order against one or more American companies for infringing
10. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2 at 1, 2.
11. See Louis S. Mastriani & Beau A. Jackson, Section 337 Investigations
Before the U.S. International Trade Commission: The Evolving Domestic
Industry Requirement and Its Implications for Global Intellectual Property
Litigation, 17 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 52, 53 (2011).
12. IAN FEINBERG & GARY M. HNATH, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT
LITIGATION 2012, at 6–7 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2012).
13. Kumar, supra note 1, at 537.
14. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 78 (prepared statement of
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
15. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 95–96 (prepared statement of
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
16. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 1.
17. Cf. id. at 3 (stating that in considering these defenses, “the
Commission has indicated that the fact that an asserted patent is subject to a
[]RAND obligation does not preclude a finding that a respondent has violated
section 337 with respect to that patent”).
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SEPs. This Note examines why the ITC is an inappropriate
forum for these complex battles and the resulting harm to
American consumers and industry. Part I of this Note provides
background on SEPs and discusses the ITC’s history and
purpose. Part II analyzes whether the ITC was intended to
handle domestic patent disputes and whether it is equipped to
do so. Part III argues that Congress should prohibit domestic
companies from seeking exclusion orders for SEPs against
fellow American companies at the ITC. Specifically, this Note
contends the ITC was established to protect domestic industry,
and that interest cannot be served when one American
company seeks an SEP exclusion order against another
American company. Rather, the federal court system is better
equipped to conduct the careful balancing required in these
cases to protect intellectual property rights and American
consumers for maximum benefit to the U.S. economy.
I. STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
This Part introduces standard-essential patents and
provides background on the International Trade Commission.
Section A outlines the many benefits of SEPs both for
businesses and consumers. It also explains how these patents
can harm the market through hold-ups and the steps SSOs
take to reduce this risk. Section B provides a summary of the
ITC and its relevant statutes. It also gives a brief history of the
Commission and explains why it is increasingly attractive to
patent litigants.
A. STANDARDS AND STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
19

Industry-wide standards are not a new concept. In 1866,
railroads adopted standard gauge rails throughout the United
States to eliminate incompatibility between different rail
20
networks and facilitate westward expansion. Standards have
18. See, e.g., ITC: Microsoft Xbox Doesn't Violate Motorola Mobility
Patent, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 23, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2013-05-23/business/chi-microsoft-motorola-mobility-antitrust-20130523_1_
motorola-mobility-itc-judge-david-shaw-standard-essential-patents (detailing
Motorola’s battle to ban Microsoft’s Xbox video gaming system); Ribeiro, supra
note 2 (highlighting ITC investigations between Motorola and Apple and
Motorola and Microsoft).
19. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 95 (prepared statement of
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
20. Id.
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become more prevalent as technology markets have grown over
21
the decades. In fact, it is not uncommon for today’s
technologically advanced products to require thousands of
22
patented inventions that must work together.
These industry-wide standards offer many benefits to
companies and consumers. For one, they allow products from
different companies to work together which increases the
23
chance of market success. “[T]hey facilitate the adoption and
advancement of technology as well as the development of
24
products that can interoperate with one another.” Standards
can “create enormous value for consumers by increasing
25
competition, innovation, product quality and choice.” These
26
advantages often result in lower costs for consumers. These
cost savings are realized in two primary ways. First, standards
can increase manufacturing volume which lowers cost through
27
economies of scale.
Second, standards “increase price
competition by eliminating ‘switching costs’ for consumers who
desire to switch from products manufactured by one firm to
28
those manufactured by another.” However, the benefits for
consumers do not stop at cost. Standards also can help protect
public health and safety and promote efficient resource
29
allocation.
The downside of industry-wide standards is they create
30
“essential patents.” Once manufacturers have started selling
products based on the standard, “switching to a [nonstandardized] design can be extremely costly and commercially
21. See Lim, supra note 8, at 564 (“As high-technology markets
proliferate, the importance of interoperability standards that permit products
from different vendors to work together continues to grow.”).
22. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 7.
23. See 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32 .
24. Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790
(N.D. Tex. 2008).
25. Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, & Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, at 2 (June 6, 2012) (Third Party United States
Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.
26. See Research in Motion, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (explaining that
standards lower cost by increasing product manufacturing volume and
increasing price competition).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Joseph F.
Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
30. Research in Motion, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
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31

infeasible.” As more and more products adopt the standard,
32
the cost of switching to an alternative technology increases,
and companies essentially become locked in to using the
33
standardized technology. When this occurs, royalty rates to
use the SEP become based not on the patent’s true market
34
value but on the costs and delays of switching. Therefore, once
competitors are locked in, the SEP owner can “hold up” an
entire industry by demanding extremely high prices for the
35
license to use the standardized technology. This hurts
consumers by delaying the incorporation of standards into
products and passing higher royalties through to customers by
36
increasing the prices.
To reduce this risk, SSOs adopt policies to control the
37
licensing of SEPs. Some SSOs “require members to reveal any
38
patents or patent applications that relate to the standard.”
39
There can even be penalties for non-disclosure. Other SSOs
“require members to commit to license their patented
40
technologies on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.”
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
The U.S. International Trade Commission is an
“independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad
41
investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.” The ITC’s
mission is three-fold: “(1) administer U.S. trade remedy laws
within its mandate in a fair and objective manner; (2) provide
the President, [U.S. Trade Representative], and Congress with
independent analysis, information, and support on matters of
tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness; and (3)
maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
31. Lim, supra note 8, at 562 (quoting Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2016 (2007)).
32. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32.
33. Id.
34. Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 6 (statement of Edith Ramirez,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
35. See id. at 6–7.
36. See id. at 7.
37. See Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788,
791 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
38. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32.
39. Lim, supra note 8, at 567.
40. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32 .
41. About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc
.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
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42

(HTS).” It is headed by six commissioners appointed by the
43
President and confirmed by the Senate. The ITC’s main
statutory authority for the purposes of this Note originates in
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which “makes it unlawful,
among other unfair acts, to import any article that infringes a
patent, trade mark or copyright that is valid and enforceable in
44
the United States.” In addition to Section 337 investigations,
the ITC investigates anti-dumping and illegal subsidy claims,
administers the tariff system, and performs industry and
45
macroeconomic analyses. Frequent litigants at the ITC
include prominent multinational corporations such as Apple,
Rolls-Royce, Microsoft, General Electric, Samsung, Pfizer, and
46
Ford.
Section 1337 gives the ITC jurisdiction over “[u]nfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles” that “(i) . . . destroy or substantially injure an industry
in the United States; (ii) . . . prevent the establishment of such
an industry; or (iii) . . . restrain or monopolize trade and
47
commerce in the United States.” In addition, Section 1337
bans the importation into the United States of any products
48
that “infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent.”
1. The History of the ITC
Examining the ITC’s history shows its formation and
subsequent development resulted from protectionist sentiments
49
in the first third of the 20th century. Woodrow Wilson
established the ITC’s predecessor, the Tariff Commission, in
1916 as a regulatory agency to assist the President in trade50
related decisions. One of its roles was to “spot unfair trade
practices and dumping, and conduct other, similar investigative
51
functions.” Congress officially authorized the Commission’s

42. Id.
43. Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 52.
44. Id.
45. See id. (explaining the authority of the ITC).
46. Id. at 53.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
48. Id.
49. See JOHN M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND
AND EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 (1976).
50. WENDY L. HANSEN, REGULATORY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO
TRADE POLICY: A STUDY OF ITC DECISION-MAKING 1975–1985, at 3 (1990).
51. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 87.
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52

creation in the Revenue Act of 1916. Then in 1922, the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act gave the Commission a more
53
advanced role in investigating unfair trade practices. The
54
emphasis on protecting U.S. industry was paramount. “The
act defined as unfair any practice, the effect or tendency of
which was to destroy or substantially injure a U.S.
55
industry . . . .” The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1934 reorganized the
Tariff Commission and established more specific powers and
detailed
procedures
for
its
unfair
trade
practice
56
investigations. Section 337 and the Commission’s related
57
responsibilities were first outlined in this Act.
In the Trade Act of 1974, the Tariff Commission was
58
renamed the International Trade Commission. The Act added
additional procedural requirements to conform with the
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, and it enlarged
the Commission’s responsibility for areas of relief under section
59
337. Most importantly, it empowered the ITC to grant
60
exclusion orders on its own, a power previously limited to the
President upon receiving a recommendation from the
61
Commission. Since 1974, there have been over 850 Section
62
337 investigations at the ITC. While the ITC has traditionally
63
handled other trade issues, like antidumping claims, rather
than intellectual property disputes, ninety-four percent of all
Section 337 investigations in recent years have involved patent
64
infringement. Potential reasons for this will be discussed
65
below.
52. Taras M. Czebiniak, When Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do You
Wear? Choosing Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in
§ 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99 (2011).
53. See 62 CONG. REC. 12,490 (1922) (statement of the Managers on the
part of the House); DOBSON, supra note 49, at 94; HANSEN, supra note 50, at 3.
54. See DOBSON, supra note 49, at 94.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 34.
57. Id. at 102–03.
58. HANSEN, supra note 50, at 9.
59. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129.
60. See infra Part I.B.2 for a description of exclusion orders.
61. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129–30.
62. MARCIA H. SUNDEEN ET AL., UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC: A
TREATISE ON SECTION 337 ACTIONS § 1:10 (2012).
63. See Joe Mullin, ITC Annual Survey: A Gatekeeper’s Power Persists,
CORP. COUNS., May 1, 2009, at 1.
64. Kumar, supra note 1, at 532.
65. See infra Part I.B.3.
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2. Procedure and Remedies at the ITC
To litigate at the ITC, a claimant is first required to
demonstrate the existence of an industry in the United States
66
related to the matter before the Commission. However, the
67
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Coaxial
68
Cable Connectors ITC decision, and the Federal Circuit’s
decision in InterDigital Communications v. International Trade
69
Commission have eased this domestic industry requirement in
70
recent years. In addition to establishing the existence of a
domestic industry, the claimant must also establish
importation and infringement of the asserted intellectual
71
property right. If the ITC decides the action has merit, it
72
opens an investigation.
Once an investigation is opened, the ITC refers it to one of
six administrative law judges (ALJs) for an evidentiary
73
hearing. There is a short period of discovery—often less than
five months—and then a hearing, typically only six or seven
74
months after the ITC opens the investigation. The ALJ then
issues an Initial Determination, which is automatically
75
considered by the six-member Commission. The Commission
has the option to decline review (in which case the Initial
Determination becomes final), review and adopt the Initial
66. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 534 (stating that a claimant “must show
that ‘an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the
patent, . . . exists or is in the process of being established’” and that the ITC
divides this requirement into a technical prong and an economic prong, of
which the claimant must prove at least one)(quoting § 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(2)).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012); see Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 110–11
(explaining that the Act eliminated the requirement that the domestic
industry be “efficiently and economically operat[ed]” and expanded the
definition of “substantial investment”).
68. Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors & Components Thereof & Prods.
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Nov. 2011) (Final).
69. 690 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that licensing activities
can fulfill the domestic industry requirement).
70. Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 105, 114; see Certain Coaxial Cable
Connectors & Components Thereof & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283, 44 (Nov. 2011) (Final) (holding that litigation costs
related to licensing the patent at issue may satisfy the domestic industry
requirement).
71. Tom M. Schaumberg et al., Advantages of a Section 337 Investigation
at the U.S. International Trade Commission, IP LITIGATOR, May–June 2006,
at 24.
72. Kumar, supra note 1, at 536.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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76

Determination, modify it, or reverse it. Once the Commission
77
rules, any order goes into effect after sixty days. The
78
President can disapprove and reverse it on policy grounds,
79
although this is very rare.
If the ITC determines a violation has occurred, it has only
one remedy—issuing an exclusion order directing U.S. Customs
80
officials to stop infringing products at the border. There are
two types of exclusion orders. The more common is a limited
exclusion order, which “prevents entry of a particular
81
company’s goods.”
General exclusion orders “prohibit[]
importation of all infringing goods, including those of third82
parties.” To obtain a general exclusion order, the complainant
must show (1) it is necessary to prevent circumvention of a
limited exclusion order and (2) there is a pattern of violation or
83
difficulty in identifying the infringing products’ source. Ceaseand-desist orders can also be issued in limited circumstances to
“prevent the sale of ‘commercially significant’ domestic
84
inventories of infringing goods.”
A party litigating before the ITC can also simultaneously
litigate the same patent infringement dispute in federal court,
creating the possibility of inconsistent rulings if the ITC and
the court disagree on whether the infringement occurred or on
85
the appropriate remedy, a problem that is exacerbated by the
fact that ITC decisions are not accorded collateral estoppel
86
effect. In fact, in almost ninety percent of ITC investigations

76. Id. at 537.
77. Id.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012).
79. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 537 n.43 (explaining that ITC decisions
have only been overturned five times and not since the mid-1980s). But see
Brian X. Chen, Obama Administration Overturns Ban on Apple Products, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 3, 2013, 4:23 PM) http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
08/03/obama-administration-overturns-ban-on-apple-products/ (reporting the
Obama administration’s veto of an ITC exclusion order, the first time an
exclusion order has been vetoed since 1987).
80. Kumar, supra note 1, at 565.
81. Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
PATENT LITIGATION 2012, at 259, 263 (Ian Feinberg & Gary M. Hnath eds.,
2012).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Kumar, supra note 1, at 538.
85. See id. at 538–39.
86. See id. at 540.
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there are also related cases brought in federal district court.
Of twenty-two parallel cases from 1972 to 2006, nine resulted
88
in conflicting decisions.
3. Increasing Attractiveness of the ITC
The ITC is an increasingly attractive venue for companies.
89
For instance, in 2003, 18 Section 337 complaints were filed.
90
That number increased to 36 in 2009 and up to 70 in 2011. In
fact, caseload at the ITC has increased five-fold over the past
91
15 years. Part of the increase is attributable to the 1988
amendments to the ITC statute and recent decisions that
92
broadened the definition of domestic industry. While the ITC
93
hears a variety of cases, standard-essential patent claims
from high-tech consumer electronics and electronic device
94
companies are among the most frequent cases. In a review of
ITC cases, seventy-five percent of section 337 investigations
and eighty percent of the most recent investigations involve
95
electronic and computer-related industries. These cases are
particularly prevalent because “most products containing these
technologies are manufactured abroad and imported into the
96
United States.”
Several features of the ITC’s statutory provisions and
procedures make it attractive to patent litigants. First, the ITC

87. Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade
Commission as a Patent Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 24 (2011).
88. Kumar, supra note 1, at 539.
89. Hnath, supra note 81, at 265.
90. Id.; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FY 2011 AT A GLANCE:
OPERATION 2: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS (2011),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/YIR_OP4_final.pdf.
91. Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 171 (2011).
92. See SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 14; Kumar, supra note 1, at
532; see also supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
93. See Joe Mullin, International Trade Commission Survey 2010: Casting
a Wider Net, CORP. COUNSEL, June 18, 2010 (stating that companies that
manufacture “quirky products” such as sandals, toys, and games used to, and
occasionally still do, petition the ITC); Daniel D. Quick & Jonathan Redway,
Barring the Door: The International Trade Commission as a Means to Prevent
Importation of Goods Utilizing Misappropriated Trade Secrets, MICH. BUS.
L.J., Spring 2012, at 39, 40 (describing examples of ITC cases dealing with
industries other than consumer electronics).
94. See Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 2; Mullin, supra note 93.
95. Cotropia, supra note 87, at 24.
96. Id. at 5.
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issues its decisions quickly. By statute, the ITC is required to
“conclude
any
such
investigation
and
make
its
determination . . . at the earliest practicable time after the date
98
of publication of notice of such investigation.” A timeline of
99
twelve to sixteen months from start to completion is typical.
That is about half the time of an average district court
100
litigation. Even traditional “rocket-docket” districts are being
flooded with cases and experiencing slower case schedules,
101
which makes the ITC even more attractive. In addition to its
speed, the ITC has in rem jurisdiction over the actual products,
allowing it to reach foreign companies that are beyond the
102
reach of federal courts.
Nationwide personal jurisdiction
provides the ability to name all known companies importing
infringing products in one proceeding and compel testimony
103
from a third party anywhere in the United States. Process is
104
also easier to serve. In fact, discovery can begin as soon as an
investigation is instituted, so litigants do not have to wait for
105
perfect service of foreign parties as in district court. The ITC
also provides for broad discovery with few limits on
106
interrogatories, foreign discovery, or scope of discovery, and
107
respondents must produce requested information or default.
Another attractive feature is that the ALJs have extensive
108
experience in patent cases
and the complex technologies
109
involved. However, the opportunity to obtain an exclusion
order prohibiting an infringing competitor from even importing
its products into the country is perhaps the ITC’s most
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Hnath, supra note 81, at 264.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012).
Hnath, supra note 81, at 264.
Mullin, supra note 63, at 1.
See Eileen McDermott, The End of the Rocket Docket, 212 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 43, 45 (2011) (explaining that so called “rocket-dockets” like the
Eastern District of Texas are backed up because they have attracted so many
cases in recent years). But see Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent
Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 415–16 (2010) (arguing that “rocket dockets” still
exist in some districts).
102. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 535; Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11,
at 53.
103. See Bruce Barker & Stewart Brown, Why You Should Consider the
ITC Option, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr. 2003, at 39, 41.
104. Hnath, supra note 81, at 264.
105. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 53.
106. Kumar, supra note 1, at 536.
107. Hnath, supra note 81, at 264.
108. Id. at 265; see also Kumar, supra note 1, at 536.
109. Barker & Brown, supra note 103, at 40.
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110

appealing aspect for many litigants. Preventing a competitor’s product from reaching the market is especially valuable in
the technology industry—the source of most SEP investigations
111
at the ITC—because of the short product lifecycles. As a
result, the damage can be significant even if an exclusion order
112
is overturned on appeal. While the exclusion order has the
benefit of preventing U.S. consumers from purchasing the
competitor’s product, it can also have an impact on global
113
sales. For instance, if the competitor’s product is designed to
114
be incorporated into an end product, overseas buyers will not
use the competitor’s product if the end product could not be sold
115
in the United States.
For these reasons, American companies are turning to the
116
ITC to litigate SEP disputes with other American companies.
As an example, since 2010, Motorola has been pursuing a highprofile case against Apple before the ITC over alleged SEP
infringement, which could result in banning the importation of
popular Apple products including iPhones, iPads, and Mac
117
computers. In another example, Motorola has pursued an
110. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 53 (“[T]he unique power of
the Commission’s remedies . . . is an important tactical asset for s.337
complainants.”).
111. Ryan N. Herrington & Brendan P. Rogers, Shock and Awe: The
Increasing Popularity and Intrinsic Value of an ITC Investigation, IP
LITIGATOR, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 10.
112. Id. While exclusion orders are not enforced during appeal,
customers—whether end consumers or other businesses looking to include the
technology in their own products—will be hesitant to purchase or use a
product facing an impending exclusion order because of the drastic
consequences if the exclusion order is upheld.
113. Id.
114. As an example, if there is an ITC investigation regarding the
technology used for a certain type of interactive programming guide and
parental control technology for televisions, television or set-top box makers are
unlikely to use that technology in their products to prevent their own products
from being banned for incorporating the technology subject to exclusion order.
See Eric Schweibenz & Thomas Yebernetsky, ALJ Shaw Denies Motions in
Certain Products Containing Interactive Program Guide and Parental Control
Technology (337-TA-845), ITC 337 L. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.itcblog
.com/20130221/alj-shaw-denies-motions-in-certain-products-containing
-interactive-program-guide-and-parental-control-technology-337-ta-845/.
115. Id.
116. See generally Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 88–90 (prepared
statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (providing an
overview of the use of the ITC in SEP cases and the FTC’s concern over this
practice).
117. See Complaint at 1–3, Certain Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable
Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
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ITC case against Microsoft alleging that the Xbox infringes on
SEPs owned by Motorola, threatening the availability of the
118
popular gaming console to American consumers.
In both
cases, the Federal Trade Commission petitioned the ITC to not
grant exclusion orders as it would be contrary to the public
119
interest. The complainants in SEP cases are not limited to
only large public companies though. For instance, Linex
Technologies, Inc., of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, brought a
case before the ITC alleging its SEPs, which limit fading of
wireless internet signal strength in buildings, were being
infringed by several domestic companies including Hewlett120
Packard and Apple.
This case called into question the
availability of every MacBook model and many HP products
121
including PCs and servers.
II. SUITABILITY OF THE ITC FOR DOMESTIC
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT LITIGATION
This Part analyzes why the ITC is not an appropriate
venue for SEP disputes between domestic companies. First, it
examines the negative effects on competition and consumer
welfare resulting from these cases. Next, it explains why
domestic SEP litigation is contrary to the ITC’s history and the
statutory intent. This Part also examines whether federal
courts have the tools needed to decide these cases and reach the
337-TA-740, USITC Pub. 2759 (Oct. 6, 2010) (outlining the background of the
case and Motorola’s claims); Ribeiro, supra note 2 (providing an update of the
adjudication and highlighting the potential consequences).
118. See Complaint at 1, 6–7, Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related
Software, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-749, USITC Pub. 2770
(Nov. 22, 2010).
119. See Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, &
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752 (Third Party United States Federal
Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.
120. See Complaint at 1, Certain Wireless Commc’n Devices & Sys.,
Components Thereof, & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC
Pub. 2802 (May 6, 2011); Susan Decker, Apple, HP, Aruba Accused by Linex of
Infringing Wi-Fi Patents, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-09/apple-hp-aruba-accused-by-linex-of
-infringing-wi-fi-patents.html; Alex Gasser, Linex Files New 337 Complaint
Regarding Certain Wireless Communication Devices and Systems, ITC 337 L.
BLOG (May 10, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.itcblog.com/20110510/linex
-files-new-337-complaint-regarding-certain-wireless-communication-devices
-and-systems/.
121. Steven Sande, Apple Accused of Violating Patented Wi-Fi Antenna
Designs, TUAW (May 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.tuaw.com/2011/05/18/
apple-accused-of-violating-patented-wi-fi-antenna-designs/.
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outcome that maximizes benefits for American consumers and
industry. Finally, this Part analyzes previously proposed
solutions and explains why they are either too broad or are not
guaranteed to remedy the situation.
A. DOMESTIC COMPANIES LITIGATING SEP DISPUTES AT THE
ITC
Over the past decade, domestic companies have
increasingly found themselves vulnerable to litigation at the
ITC. For instance, the Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits
ruling extended jurisdiction over allegedly infringing imports
122
by domestic companies.
After this decision, the ITC’s
jurisdiction even extends to U.S. manufacturers that simply
offshore the assembly of products that are otherwise
123
manufactured in the United States. This means the ITC can
issue exclusion orders against products that are nearly
completely manufactured in the United States but are shipped
abroad to apply “finishing touches” before being sold in the
124
United States.
Furthermore, even if the product is
manufactured in the United Sates, many domestic
manufacturers include at least one imported component in
125
their supply chain due to globalization. This arrangement
leaves these companies exposed to Section 337 investigations
because these components can be subject to exclusion orders.
While ITC jurisdiction traditionally extended primarily to
products by foreign companies wholly manufactured in foreign
countries and then imported into the United States, domestic
respondents now appear in eighty seven percent of all ITC
cases because of these expansions of the type of products that
126
fall within the ITC’s jurisdiction.
As the number of domestic respondents at the ITC has
grown, it is important to critically consider the ITC’s suitability
for SEP disputes between two domestic companies. One
primary concern is that the ability to seek exclusionary relief at
the ITC in these cases could jeopardize the standard-setting
122. SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 13–14.
123. See Bryan A. Schwartz, Beyond the Amendments: Federal and ITC
Case Law Developments That May Determine the Long-Term Future of Section
337 Litigation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 491, 497–98 (1994).
124. See id.
125. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of
Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
63, 89 (2008).
126. Kumar, supra note 1, at 575.
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system, which would have negative effects on competition and
127
consumer welfare by increasing switching costs.
Another
reason the ITC may not be appropriate for these cases is that
they involve contractual obligations between the parties due to
the commitment to license SEPs on RAND terms. But, the ITC
has rejected affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel,
contract, implied license, and waiver that may be applicable in
128
such contract disputes. In fact, in an ITC investigation in
1987, the ITC “indicated that it was not the appropriate forum
for patent litigation involving a contractual commitment to
129
This
renegotiate an expired license in good faith.”
commitment is analogous to the commitment an SEP owner
has to license the SEP to its competitors on RAND terms.
Therefore, the ITC has admitted on its own accord that it is not
the appropriate forum for domestic SEP disputes.
Recent federal court decisions asserting that the
availability of injunctive relief is limited in domestic SEP cases
further support the position that the ITC is not an appropriate
forum for these disputes because exclusion orders are the ITC’s
only remedy. In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Judge Richard
Posner, sitting by designation, said standard-essential patent
owners should not be entitled to injunctive relief unless the
130
licensee refuses to pay a RAND royalty.
eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, established a four-factor test for
determining whether a patent owner is entitled to injunctive
relief:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
131
disserved by a permanent injunction.

Judge Posner reasoned that by committing to license its SEP
on RAND terms, the owner “implicitly acknowledge[s] that a
royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that
132
patent.” Therefore, if Judge Posner’s reasoning is accurate,
an SEP plaintiff cannot meet the second part of the eBay test
127.
128.
129.
130.
2012).
131.
132.

Bartowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 1.
Cf. supra note 17.
Id. at 8.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill.
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
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because the owner acknowledges monetary damages would not
133
be inadequate by agreeing to license on RAND terms.
If
injunctions are not an appropriate form of relief in these cases,
then exclusion orders, which also prevent the sale of the
infringing product, are not appropriate either. However, there
is no other option at the ITC since the ITC cannot provide
134
monetary damages. The statutory regime governing the ITC,
which mandates an exclusion order if a violation is found,
overrides the common law principles of equity expressed in
135
eBay.
The only conclusion is that these cases cannot be
appropriately handled by the ITC.
B. DOMESTIC SEP DISPUTES ARE CONTRARY TO THE ITC’S
PURPOSE
In addition to its inability to fashion remedies that are
tailored to the unique features of domestic SEP cases, issuing
exclusion orders in these cases is arguably contrary to the ITC’s
purpose. Congress established the ITC to protect domestic
industry. The statutes governing the ITC reinforce this purpose
and require the Commission to act for the benefit of American
consumers. While the ITC does have one statutory provision
that could arguably allow it some flexibility in deciding SEP
cases to produce outcomes beneficial for American consumers
and industry, it has rarely utilized this provision. As a result,
the ITC cannot remain true to its history or statutory intent
when deciding domestic SEP disputes.
1. The ITC’s Protectionist History
The ITC’s nearly century-long history reveals that its
primary purpose has always been protecting domestic industry.
Perhaps no one stated it as clearly as Rep. Lazaro who, when
133. See id. at 915 (“[]RAND royalty would provide all the relief to which a
[plaintiff] would be entitled if it proved infringement . . . and thus it is not
entitled to an injunction.”).
134. See Hnath, supra note 81.
135. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (stating that the ITC has
declined to follow eBay and that the Federal Circuit has approved of this
approach). The Patent Act, which Article III courts apply when deciding these
disputes, expressly retains the common law principles of equity expressed in
eBay, while no such provision is included in the ITC statutes. Kumar, supra
note 1, at 577. While the ITC says these factors are taken into account under
the public interest factor of its statutory scheme, this has never prevented the
ITC from issuing an exclusion order in nearly twenty-five years. Id.
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addressing the creation of the Trade Commission in the 1922
Tariff Act, said on the House floor, “our duty as legislators is to
136
look after the interests of America first.” His statement was
137
followed by applause. Statements like these have led scholars
to conclude that “Congress created the ITC to gain protectionist
138
support for trade reform.” In fact, even those who advocated
for an apolitical Tariff Commission saw its purpose as
139
protecting domestic industry.
Since the Tariff Act of 1922, the Commission has been
responsible for investigating unfair foreign trade practices
140
against the United States. The Commission’s protectionist
purpose is evident from the Tariff Act’s language. The bill’s
title even identifies it as “[a]n Act . . . to encourage the
141
industries of the United States.” This is a common aspect of
the bills that created or granted authorization to the ITC—they
142
all relate to protecting American industry. The Tariff Act also
charges the Commission with investigating acts “the effect or
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an
143
industry . . . in the United States.”
Recent revisions to the statutes governing the ITC have
maintained the Commission’s original purpose. In the 1974
Trade Act, Congress expanded the ITC’s powers to guard
144
against unfair imports. Once again, commentators pointed
145
out the protectionist slant of the ITC statutes. In 1986, the
136. 62 CONG. REC. 12,522 (1922) (statement of Rep. Lazaro).
137. Id.
138. Kumar, supra note 1, at 540; see also 62 CONG. REC. 12,712–13 (1922)
(statement of Rep. Longworth) (stating that he is in support of protecting not
only the industries in his district but industries nationwide).
139. See 62 CONG. REC. 12,522 (1922) (statement of Rep. Lazaro)
(explaining that the Tariff Commission should be nonpartisan and committed
to “reasonable protection”).
140. See DOBSON, supra note 49, at 33.
141. Tariff Act of 1922, H.R. 7456, 67th Cong. (1922) (as passed by Senate,
Sept. 20, 1922).
142. See Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 98–99 n.39 (presenting a list of the
purposes of the acts which have created or amended the ITC statutes).
143. H.R. 7456, § 316(a).
144. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 544 (explaining that to protect domestic
industry from unfair practices, Congress made the ITC more independent and
gave it new powers).
145. See, e.g., DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129 (citing press comments
criticizing the 1974 Trade Act and the ITC for protectionism); John M. Dobson,
Six Decades of Stalemate: The Changing Mandate of the U.S. Tariff
Commission, 14 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 269, 276 (1980) [hereinafter Six
Decades] (“[A] number of individuals both inside and outside the commission
consider [the Trade Act of 1974] a protectionist law.”).
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ITC itself noted in a report that Section 337 “was originally
intended as a trade statute to protect U S [sic] workers and
146
firms from all types of unfair foreign trade practices.” Even
the 1988 broadening of the definition of domestic industry,
which has arguably allowed more foreign claimants at the ITC,
was done with the intent “to protect domestic IP holders from
147
infringement by foreign companies.”
This legislative history leads to the conclusion that Section
337, which governs the ITC and which domestic companies use
to litigate SEP cases, is a trade statute to protect American
148
industry, not enforce intellectual property rights. This is an
interpretation supported by international observers and federal
courts. For instance, when the United States became a party to
the Uruguay Round Agreements, which require countries to
treat imports no less favorably than domestic products,
foreigners complained that the ITC violated this
149
requirement. The Federal Circuit has said that federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases while ITC
authority is limited to investigating “unfair practices in import
150
trade.” If the ITC was created to protect domestic industry, as
the legislative history indicates, it is not the appropriate forum
for settling domestic SEP disputes. As stated in the Tariff Act
of 1922, the ITC was established to prevent acts which could
“destroy or substantially injure an industry . . .in the United
151
States.”
This purpose cannot be carried out when one
domestic company seeks an exclusion order against another
American company for infringing an SEP. It seems highly
unlikely that Apple, by infringing a Motorola patent needed for
the iPhone to receive data by wireless transmission, is seeking
to “destroy or substantially injure” the industry in which it
generates $22 billion per quarter, more than all of Microsoft’s
146. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-86-150, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: STRENGTHENING TRADE LAW PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 22 (1986), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130844
.pdf.
147. Kumar, supra note 1, at 532.
148. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 53.
149. See Report of the Panel, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. 36S/345 at 14 (1990); Report of the
Panel, United States—Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies,
L/5333 (May 26, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. 30S/107 at 4 (1984).
150. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 559.
151. Tariff Act of 1922, H.R. 7456, 67th Cong. § 316(a) (1922) (as passed by
Senate, Sept. 20, 1922).
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152

revenue streams combined. Given these absurdities, the ITC
should not be deciding domestic SEP disputes.
2. ITC Decisions in Domestic SEP Disputes Are Inconsistent
with Policy Goals Expressed in the ITC Statutes
The ITC’s protectionist history is reflected in the policy
goals expressed through the drafting of the statute. In many
cases, the ITC’s role in deciding SEP disputes between two
domestic companies is contrary to policy goals. “[T]he ITC
exists to protect US industry from unfair trade
153
practices . . . .”
Consistent with this principle, the ITC’s
statutory language makes clear that access to the ITC for
patent cases is “only justified in cases where infringing imports
154
may harm a domestic industry.” The ITC, by statute, only
commences an investigation if “an industry in the United
States, relating to the articles protected by the patent . . . exists
155
or is in the process of being established.” This requirement
would not be included in the statute if the ITC’s purpose is
something other than protecting domestic industry. The statute
also requires the ITC to consider the “competitive conditions in
156
the United States economy” before issuing an exclusion order.
Again, this requirement indicates the goal of ITC action is the
advancement of the U.S. economy.
Another policy decision reflected in the ITC statutes is a
much more relaxed standard for issuing exclusion orders than
the standard courts use for issuing injunctions, based on the
rationale that this strong patent rights enforcement spurs
157
innovation. However, in cases where domestic companies are
litigating over an SEP, this relaxed standard can actually
hinder innovation by making it more difficult or even
impossible for companies to incorporate into their products
standardized technologies that are necessary to compete in the
marketplace. Because of the ease of obtaining exclusion orders,
the SEP’s owner can demand outrageous licensing fees knowing
152. See Tim Worstall, Apple’s iPhone Is Now Worth More Than All of
Microsoft, FORBES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/
2012/08/19/apples-iphone-is-now-worth-more-than-all-of-microsoft/.
153. Barker & Brown, supra note 103, at 39.
154. Chien, supra note 91, at 177.
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012).
156. Id. § 1337(d)(1).
157. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 566 (stating that the ITC standard for
issuing injunctive relief is more relaxed than in eBay on the assumption that
strong enforcement through injunctive relief encourages innovation).
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that the competitor is faced with three undesirable options: (1)
pay the licensing fee and make little profit or even lose money
selling the product, (2) refuse to obtain a license and have the
product seized at the border by Customs Officials pursuant to
an ITC exclusion order, or (3) never bring the product to the
marketplace. Most companies faced with these choices will
simply choose not to bring the product to the marketplace. As a
result, the ITC’s relaxed standard actually hinders innovation
in these cases.
Another frequent justification for ITC exclusion orders is
that “the public interest favors the protection of U.S.
158
intellectual property rights by excluding infringing imports.”
However, this justification does not exist for domestic SEP
cases. In fact, the Supreme Court has said “[i]mport
restrictions . . . rest on different considerations and different
159
rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.” Along
those same lines, the Court has argued:
A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a potential power
for evil over an industry which must be recognized as an important
element in the amusement life of the nation . . . if sustained would be
gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a
160
favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.

Taken together, these statements from the Court indicate there
are different factors that must be considered in the domestic
realm than in the international realm. Infringement of U.S.
intellectual property by foreign companies harms the public
interest by stealing revenue from U.S. companies. In domestic
SEP disputes, any revenue generated from selling infringing
product remains in the U.S. economy. The dispute is over
whose “private fortune” will benefit and whose will suffer.
According to the Supreme Court, our law in general favors
consumers’ “amusement” over how to divide profit between two
161
U.S. companies.
Thus, it is more important that consumers have access to
iPads and Xboxes than to have them stopped at the border
158. Id. at 571 (quoting In re Laser Bar Code Scanners & Scan Engines,
Components Thereof & Prods. Containing Same, Intl. Trade Comm’n Inv. No.
337-TA-551, 2007 ITC LEXIS 623, at *34–35 (June 14, 2007) (citing TwoHandle Centerset Fausets & Escutcheons, & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-422, USITC Pub. 3332 (June 19, 2000))).
159. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
125 (1973).
160. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
519 (1917).
161. See id.
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because two U.S. companies cannot agree on a reasonable
licensing rate for a standardized technology. However, the ITC
statutes, which are tailored for infringement by foreign
companies as explained above, are not designed to allow the
ITC to engage in this pattern of analysis.
Finally, since one of the factors the ITC must consider
when issuing an exclusion order is the existence of U.S. jobs in
the industry, one of the ITC’s main purposes is to protect
162
American jobs.
However, in domestic SEP disputes, this
purpose is difficult to carry out. From a manufacturing
perspective, most consumer electronics, even those produced by
163
U.S. companies, are manufactured outside the United States.
Therefore, the exclusion order is not keeping Americans
employed in the manufacture of the goods. In fact, an exclusion
order has the potential to destroy American jobs. If an
American company cannot manufacture a product due to an
exclusion order or the threat of an exclusion order, the support
jobs here in the United States, such as product design and
marketing, will likely disappear. Once again, in this setting,
the ITC is actually acting against the goals and principles
established in its statutory scheme.
3. The ITC’s Public Welfare Exception
The ITC arguably does have within its statutes a provision
that would allow it some flexibility in issuing exclusion orders
in domestic SEP cases. Section 337 requires the ITC to consider
the “public health and welfare” and the “competitive conditions
in the United States economy” before issuing an exclusion
164
order.
This provision could allow the ITC to conduct the
analysis advocated in the previous sections when deciding SEP
165
cases. In fact, the Department of Justice and the FTC have
urged the ITC to apply the public welfare exception in domestic
166
SEP disputes. However, the ITC has rarely exercised this
162. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(B) (2012).
163. See Cotropia, supra note 87, at 5.
164. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
165. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (arguing that special considerations must be
taken into account when two domestic companies are litigating over an SEP).
166. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 102 (prepared statement of
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“As the
ITC has observed, these public interest factors are not meant to be given mere
lip service, but rather public health and welfare and the assurance of
competitive conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding
considerations in the administration of this statute.”) (internal citations
omitted); id. at 91 (prepared statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
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exception, with ALJs using it only four times in recent
167
decades. None of these instances involved SEPs or related
168
issues. Considering the ITC declines to use what statutory
authority it does have to handle domestic SEP cases more
appropriately, even in the midst of appeals from fellow
government agencies, the ITC is simply not the appropriate
forum for handling cases where domestic companies are
litigating over an SEP.
C. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS TO DECIDE
THESE CASES
As explained above, the ITC’s statutes and legislative
intent make it ill-equipped to resolve domestic SEP disputes in
a manner consistent with public policy. In contrast, the federal
court system is well-tailored to handle these cases for several
reasons. First, federal courts are not limited to exclusion orders
or injunctions—the federal court counterpart. Scholars argue
that “[t]he [I]TC’s overuse of injunctive relief has led to
decisions that harm domestic companies and threaten
169
innovation.” Banning products often discourages innovation
170
and makes it unprofitable to produce products.
For these
reasons, it is advantageous to have these cases settled in a
venue that has other remedies available.
Second, if there is a domestic SEP case where a ban of an
infringing product truly serves the public interest, federal

Comm’n) (“The FTC believes that the ITC has the authority under its public
interest obligations to resolve all of these questions, and to deny an exclusion
order if the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has not complied with its
RAND obligation.”).
167. Herrington & Rogers, supra note 111, at 12.
168. The circumstances in which the ITC denied or limited an exclusion
order on public interest grounds were: (1) preventing the exclusion of an
“automobile engine component that improved fuel economy” during an energy
crisis, (2) protecting the public health interest by permitting the use of foreign
products for atomic research that were superior to the domestic alternative,
(3) not banning “specialized hospital beds for burn patients when the domestic
producer could not supply alternative beds within a reasonable time,” and (4)
not banning certain infringing semiconductor chips for wireless
communication devices needed by first responders in emergencies. See
Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 87 n.28 (prepared statement of Edith
Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n); Herrington & Rogers, supra note 111,
at 12.
169. Kumar, supra note 1, at 533.
170. See id. at 571–72.
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courts have the ability to issue an injunction. Both district
court injunctions and limited exclusion orders can prevent the
infringing product that is the subject of litigation from entering
172
the market. Thus, except in the rare case where a general
exclusion order is appropriate, federal courts are able to offer
an SEP owner effectively the same remedy as the ITC if it is
warranted. The key difference between the ITC and the federal
courts is that the ITC must issue an exclusion order if a patent
is infringed while courts must exercise discretion when issuing
173
an injunction. This is because the ITC does not have to follow
the precedent established by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, which requires plaintiffs seeking a
permanent injunction in patent cases to satisfy a four-factor
174
test before a court will issue an injunction. In contrast, the
ITC statute requires issuing an exclusion order anytime there
175
is infringement. The ITC says it is not required to follow eBay
because Section 337 “represents a legislative modification of
the traditional test in equity [encapsulated in the eBay test] . . .
[and] it is unnecessary to show irreparable harm to the
176
patentee in the case of infringement by importation.”
Domestic SEP cases at the ITC are not substantively different
from an SEP patent case brought in federal court, so it is
irrational to apply the four-part eBay test in federal court and
not at the ITC.
In addition to discretion in granting injunctions, federal
courts offer an opportunity to consider a wider array of
remedies and defenses than the ITC. In terms of remedies,
federal courts can award monetary damages in addition to or in

171. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (stating that federal courts may grant
injunctions consistent with the principles of equity to prevent a violation of
patent rights).
172. See Richard G. Allison, Note, Section 337 Proceedings Before the
International Trade Commission: Antiquated Legislative Compromise or Model
Forum for Patent Dispute Resolution?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 883 (2009).
173. See Chien, supra note 91, at 172 (showing that according to statute,
the ITC “shall” issue an exclusion order if there is a violation while district
courts “may” grant injunctions to prevent patent violations).
174. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 239 (2011).
175. See Chien, supra note 91, at 172.
176. FED. TRADE COMM’N supra note 174, at 240 (quoting Certain
Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, No. 337-TA-543, slip op. at 62–63 n.230
(Int’l Trade Comm’n, June 19, 2007) (second alteration in original)).
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177

place of an injunction.
As explained by Judge Posner,
oftentimes in domestic SEP cases, monetary damages are the
178
more appropriate remedy. Patent misuse is also available as
an equitable defense in federal court permitting a defendant to
allege the owner of a RAND-encumbered patent is misusing it
179
if the owner fails to license on RAND terms. If the court
agrees the SEP is being misused, the court can suspend the
180
patentee’s ability to enforce its patent. This defense is not
available at the ITC as the Commission has explicitly rejected
the patent misuse defense along with other affirmative
181
defenses of license, estoppel, and contract. Because of the
many complicated public policy issues at stake in domestic SEP
disputes, the additional remedies and defenses available in
federal court are critical to resolving the matter in a fashion
that maximizes the benefit to the U.S. economy and consumers.
D. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES
With the shortcomings of the ITC’s ability to handle
domestic SEP cases evident, several solutions have been
proposed. Some argue that the ITC needs to focus on the third
and fourth factors in eBay, balancing the hardships between
the two companies and determining whether the public interest
would be served by preventing the infringing product from
182
reaching the marketplace. However, the ITC has consistently
refused to apply eBay, and as a result, it does not have the
extensive experience that federal courts do in conducting the
careful balancing called for by the eBay test. In addition, given
the ITC’s purpose, the eBay balancing is arguably not
appropriate for ITC investigations involving international
infringers for which the ITC’s strict enforcement mechanisms
183
are well-tailored.
Others have advocated for amending
Section 337 to redefine “domestic industry” as excluding non177. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 78 n.1 (prepared statement of
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
178. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914–15 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (discussing the application of injunctive relief and noting that neither
party was entitled to it in this SEP case).
179. See Lim, supra note 8, at 559–60.
180. Id. at 582.
181. See Certain Wireless Commc’ns Equip., Articles Therein, & Prods.
Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-577, 2006 WL 2925369, at *1 (Int’l
Trade Comm’n Oct. 3, 2006).
182. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 577.
183. See infra Part III.
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manufacturing patentees to prevent ITC suits by foreign
companies that purchase patents but do not manufacture or
184
sell the product.
However, this solution does not go far
enough to remedy the situation for the benefit of American
consumers and industry because not all domestic SEP cases
would be covered under the proposed revisions. Still others
have said the ITC should more frequently use the public
185
interest analysis already outlined in Section 337. But this
solution gives too much discretion to the ITC. Exclusion orders
and the threat of exclusion orders are being used in ways that
Congress did not intend when creating the ITC or revising its
responsibilities, yet the ITC has consistently refused to exercise
the public interest analysis to prevent outcomes that could
significantly hinder competition and industries in America.
Similarly, Chien and Lemley have recently proposed a number
of ways the ITC can exercise the discretion found in its
statutory scheme to prevent undesirable outcomes, such as
delays in implementing exclusion orders, changes in how long
companies may import excluded products if they post a bond,
186
and better shaping of remedies for infringement. For SEP
187
cases where exclusion orders are inappropriate, there is no
need or reason to rely on the hope that the ITC will simply
better exercise its discretion. Congressional action is needed to
change the situation rather than hoping the ITC will reverse
decades of precedent on its own. Finally, some proposals have
looked to changes in the standard setting process to prevent
188
patent holdups in the first place. This approach could be
unwieldy, though, as SSOs are largely self-governing. Getting
the countless SSOs across industries and across the globe to act
189
in concert would be near impossible. The result would be a
patchwork of standard setting processes that would never

184. See Allison, supra note 172, at 882.
185. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 102 (prepared statement of
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)
(arguing that the public interest factors contained in Section 337 should be
given special attention).
186. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 135, at 33–43.
187. Indeed, Chien and Lemley argue that exclusion orders are generally
not appropriate in SEP cases. Id. at 41.
188. See Lim, supra note 8, at 566–67 (reporting methods that have been
considered, including “rules generated and enforced by SSO members,”
equitable estoppel, and implied waiver).
189. Cf. id. at 568–70 (discussing the complexity of standard setting and
noting the diversity of actors involved).
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completely eliminate the issue. Therefore, a new solution
properly tailored to the problem at hand is required.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD PROHIBIT DOMESTIC SEP
CASES FROM REACHING THE ITC
“Section 337 provides little detail regarding when exclusion
orders should be denied and no guidance regarding when
190
exclusion orders should be narrowed.” It is time for Congress
to start giving the ITC some guidance. Because the ITC “is a
creature of statute and is limited in its discretion to decide
191
upon and issue relief,” Congressional action is necessary to
prohibit the ITC from hearing standard-essential patent
disputes between domestic companies.
The simple fact is the ITC is too constrained to handle SEP
disputes between domestic companies. Patents exist to promote
192
innovation.
In fact, introductions of new products and
processes—the kind that are protected by patents—are
responsible for 75 percent of the U.S. economy’s growth since
193
World War II. The Supreme Court has also “consistently held
that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation
of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is to promote
194
the progress of science and useful arts.” In addition, strong
arguments can be made that the patent system is designed to
195
promote consumer welfare. Together, these varying public
interests require a careful balancing act between protecting
196
innovation and creating a barrier to it.
Nowhere is the
balancing more difficult than domestic SEP cases where
domestic companies are litigating over a patent for a
standardized technology that is supposed to be licensed on
RAND terms. These cases simply have too many moving pieces
for the ITC’s all-or-nothing approach. They need the careful
190. Kumar, supra note 1, at 573.
191. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 9.
192. Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L.
142, 142 (2010).
193. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 94 (prepared statement of
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
194. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
511 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 79 (prepared statement of
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (suggesting that patent
protection promotes consumer welfare by stimulating the creation of new,
better, lower-cost products and processes).
196. See id.
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balancing which Section 337 does not enable the ITC to
consider.
In contrast, the federal courts have the tools to address
these domestic SEP cases. Requiring domestic SEP cases to be
litigated in the federal courts would not dramatically increase
the courts’ workload since almost 90 percent of ITC
197
investigations have district court counterparts. Many cases
198
litigated in both venues result in conflicting rulings, likely
because the federal courts are able to take into account
additional factors the ITC is statutorily barred from
considering. “[B]y allowing parallel proceedings and indeed
almost encouraging them, Congress has created the real
possibility of inconsistent results between the [ITC] and district
199
court proceedings.” The simple solution is for Congress to
pass legislation amending Section 337 to bar ITC jurisdiction
over domestic SEP cases.
Congress should remove the ITC’s jurisdiction to hear
domestic SEP cases for another reason—exclusion orders are
not an appropriate remedy in these cases. As Judge Posner has
indicated, injunctions are not usually appropriate in domestic
200
SEP cases,
and if an injunction is not appropriate, an
exclusion order is not an appropriate remedy either. But, the
ITC’s hands are tied. If the Commission finds the SEP has been
infringed, it must issue an exclusion order. The ITC has also
said that it is not necessary to show irreparable harm under
201
Section 337. This is certainly the standard that should be
required if the ITC is going to permit one domestic company to
prevent another domestic company from importing its products
into the United States. The risk of harm to consumers,
industry, and the U.S. economy is too great for any other
standard to be used. As a result, the ITC is simply not fit to
resolve these cases, and Congress should amend Section 337 to
remove ITC jurisdiction. Some may argue limiting access to
exclusion orders could lessen the incentive for companies to
innovate by removing one of their tools for protecting their
intellectual property. In this sense, the approach advocated
here would actually be worse for American industry and the
197. Cotropia, supra note 87, at 24.
198. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 539.
199. Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001).
200. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914–18 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (discussing why injunctive relief is inappropriate in such a dispute).
201. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 174, at 240.
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U.S. economy, but there is still a perfectly suitable remedy for
domestic companies to protect their SEPs—federal court. While
202
companies prefer the ITC because of its speedier resolutions
and the prospect of a total product ban, among other reasons, it
is exactly those reasons that make ITC litigation such a danger
to the U.S. economy in domestic SEP cases. In fact, ITC
litigation in domestic SEP cases actually does more to hinder
innovation than encourage it because of the threat it poses to
the standards-setting system. In this sense, the approach
advocated in this Note maximizes the benefits for the U.S.
economy and American industry by removing a looming threat
to innovation while leaving in place a more appropriate means
of resolving these disputes—federal court—so as not to remove
all intellectual property protection which would indeed
discourage innovation.
Unlike other solutions, this approach is narrowly tailored
to remove ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP cases while
allowing the ITC to keep jurisdiction of international SEP
cases. While it can be argued that exclusion orders are not
appropriate in any SEP case, there should be more lenience
when a foreign company is involved because of the difficulty of
getting the infringing foreign company into federal court. Since
the U.S. patent system’s principal purpose is to encourage
203
innovation,
procedures need to be in place to prevent
legitimately harmful patent infringement to preserve that
incentive to innovate. Though monetary damages or a
compulsory license may be the more appropriate remedy even
in an international SEP case, the claimant may not be able to
get effective relief in district court if the infringer is a foreign
company. For instance, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., the court
said U.S. patent laws do not apply to a foreign manufacturer
that “does not itself [or through a legally related entity] import
204
the allegedly infringing product into the United States.”
However, the ITC would be able to issue an exclusion order
that could stop these products at the border. The ITC’s
authority to resolve SEP disputes should be maintained for
situations like this. Domestic SEP cases do not involve these
jurisdictional concerns though, so given overwhelming public
interest against exclusion orders in these cases, the ITC should
not be able to decide them.
202. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
203. Leaffer, supra note 192, at 142.
204. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., 853 F. Supp. 104, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Admittedly, one challenge of this approach is properly
defining “domestic company.” Establishing domicile, citizenship, residence, and habitat of foreign corporations varies
depending on the purpose and type of law, making an exact
205
definition difficult to discern. Given the complexities, a firm
definition is not established in this Note. Any definition should
match the policy goals established for the ITC. Specifically, it
should be tailored to protect American companies and the U.S.
economy from being victimized by illegal trade practices by
foreign companies. The simple answer appears to be limiting
the definition to companies that are legally organized in the
206
United States. However, this could be easily circumvented by
foreign companies establishing wholly owned subsidiaries in
America. Therefore, it would seem that the definition of
domestic company should exclude companies organized in the
United States that are wholly owned subsidiaries of companies
organized outside the United States. The problem with this
definition is that some wholly owned subsidiaries, such as
Samsung Electronics America and Samsung Semiconductor,
Inc., are essentially full-fledged companies in and of
207
themselves. Rather than simply a legal means of funneling
profits back to Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. in South Korea,
these subsidiaries employ many Americans and engage in
significant research and development here in the United
208
States.
The existence of these types of wholly owned
subsidiaries that contribute substantially to the U.S. economy
seems to argue for the inclusion of some wholly owned
subsidiaries of foreign companies, but careful line drawing
would be needed to determine whether the subsidiary’s
contribution to the U.S. economy and industry is significant
enough to match the ITC’s policy aims of protecting the
domestic economy and industry and thus earn exemption from

205. See 17 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8300 (2006) (explaining the various aspects with
respect to domicile, citizenship, residence, and habitat of foreign corporations).
206. See 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 4025, at 453 (2010) (“[T]he legal existence, the home, the
domicile, the habitat, the residence, and the citizenship of the corporation is
generally deemed to be in the state by which it was created.”).
http://www.samsung.com/us/
207. About
Samsung,
SAMSUNG,
aboutsamsung/samsung_electronics/us_divisions/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
208. Cf. id. (describing the wide variety of activities taking place in
Samsung’s wholly owned subsidiaries that have their headquarters in the
United States).
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being subject to ITC jurisdiction in SEP disputes. For all
these reasons, the most appropriate definition of “domestic
company” seems primed for further discussion in the future.
The approach advocated in this Note of removing domestic
SEP cases from ITC jurisdiction while still permitting
international SEP cases is consistent with the ITC’s statutory
purpose and legislative history—to protect domestic companies
from illegal trade practices, especially if the ITC is the only
means of doing so. The ITC has adjusted to major and minor
210
statutory changes in the past. Therefore, Congress amending
Section 337 to prohibit ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP
cases would be just the latest in a string of necessary statutory
revisions to keep the Commission consistent with its intended
mission.
CONCLUSION
As domestic companies increasingly turn to the ITC to
settle disputes with fellow American companies over standardessential patent licensing, the likelihood increases that popular
consumer electronics will be stopped at the border simply
because they incorporate a technology necessary to comply with
industry standards. Given the fact that the ITC must issue an
exclusion order in these cases if it finds infringement, the ITC
is unable to resolve these domestic SEP cases in a manner that
is consistent with its protectionist legislative history and its
statutory purpose to protect domestic industry. Solutions
currently proposed are not appropriate because they are either
too broad or are not guaranteed to remedy the issue in a
manner that maximizes the benefit of American consumers and
industry. However, if Congress amends Section 337 to prohibit
ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP disputes, these cases will be
forced into the federal court system which has the tools to
decide these cases appropriately and is familiar with handling
cases where balancing the interests of the parties and the
public good is required. At the same time, the ITC should
remain a venue for international SEP cases because its unique
procedures are well-tailored to offer domestic patent holders
relief in these cases. This narrow tailoring will ensure the ITC
209. This question is especially important in light of a recent high-profile
case in which the Obama administration overturned an ITC exclusion order
banning certain models of the iPhone, which was in Samsung’s favor. See
Chen, supra note 79.
210. See Six Decades, supra note 145, at 269.
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continues to prevent foreign companies from unfairly infringing
on U.S. patents while protecting American consumers and
industry—the primary purpose of the ITC.

